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BACK TO BAKKE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REVISITED
IN EDUCATIONAL DIVERSITY
Dawn R. Swink*
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by
chains and liberate him, bring him to the starting line of a race
and then say, 'You are free to compete with all others' and still
justly believe you have been completely fair. 1
In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons
equally, we must treat them differently. 2
I. INTRODUCTION

Affirmative action in higher education has never been more
established, and more vulnerable, than it is today. It is
difficult to find a reputable school that does not practice some
form of affirmative action, yet affirmative action is under the
most serious attack it has endured in decades.
Recent
constitutional challenges have yielded conflicting results in
Texas, Washington, Georgia, Maryland, and Michigan. The
fundamental issue in these cases and in this article is whether
educational diversity is a compelling interest that justifies
racial preferences in university admission programs.
Affirmative action programs do serve compelling interests.
Our universities are, and should continue to be, places where
people from different walks of life and diverse backgrounds
come together to learn from one another. Learning with such
people helps destroy racial stereotypes and animosity. This
* Assistant Professor of Business Law at the University of Saint Thomas in St. Paul,
Minnesota. I would like to thank Vincent, Zachary and Chantel Wang for their neverending faith, love, and patience. A special thank you to Mr. Chad Balfanz for his
incredible proof-reading skills.
1. Nicolaus Mills, Introduction, in Debating Affirmative Action 1, 7 (Nicolaus
Mills, ed., Delta 1994) (writing about President Lyndon Johnson's commencement
speech at Howard University in June 1965).
2. Regents of U. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (opinion ofBlackmun,
J.).
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article argues that diversity should continue to be used as a
factor in the admissions process.
University education typically occurs early in life and is of
limited duration. Applying affirmative action programs only
during this period creates an interesting paradox. Any
detrimental effects from the programs will be short-lived.
However, because affirmative action is applied to the formative
years, the benefits last a lifetime. In other words, education can
be the "ramp up" to a level playing field, eliminating the need
for affirmative action later in life or in other fields of endeavor.
Race should be used as a factor in admissions.
This article traces the formative history of affirmative
action, including the Bakke decision. It outlines recent Court
decisions in Texas, Washington, Georgia, Maryland, and
Michigan and examines the status of "color-blind" programs in
California as potential indicators of what happens when race
as a factor is removed from the admissions selection process.
Finally, the importance of racial diversity in higher education
is analyzed.

II. THE COLORFUL HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The U.S. Constitution is not a color-blind document. In
fact, it is race-biased. In its original form, each member of the
House of Representatives was required to have been a "Citizen"
for seven years, 3 and each member of the Senate was required
to have been a "Citizen" for nine years. 4 Moreover, the
Framers of the Constitution also required the President to be a
natural born citizen or a citizen at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution. 5 These seemingly innocuous requirements
failed to include any persons other than whites; African
Americans were effectively excluded from citizenship. 6 In Dred
Scott, the Supreme Court's analysis of the framers' original
intent reveals that a "perpetual and impassable barrier was
intended to be erected between the white race and the one they

3. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
4. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
5. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
6. The original intent of the framers was not to include Mrican-Americans as
citizens, as the founding fathers believed that Mrican-Americans were of an 'inferior
order" for whom slavery was a "benefit." See Dred Scott u. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 403
(1856).
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had reduced to slavery."7
To maintain this color-conscious barrier from 1790 to 1870,
the U.S. Congress limited naturalization and voting rights to
whites. From 1879 to 1906,8 the color barrier fell slightly when
the U.S. Supreme Court expanded naturalization to include
whites and freed slaves. 9 The number of representatives
allotted to each state was determined by the number of "free
Persons," "excluding Indians not taxed" and "three-fifths of all
other persons." 10
Despite its misguided beginnings, it was the Fourteenth
Amendment where notions of affirmative action originated.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that "No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the
equal protection of the laws." 11 The underlying policy was that
state governments must treat similarly situated persons in a
similar manner. 12 When the U.S. Supreme Court had its first
opportunity to interpret "Equal Protection" in the Fourteenth
Amendment, Justice Black, dissenting, noted that the
Amendment "came into being primarily to protect Negroes
from discrimination, and while some of its language can and
does protect others, all know that the chief purpose behind it
was to protect ex-slaves." 13 It was this ambiguity in defining
"Equal Protection" that led to the seminal decision, Plessy v.
Ferguson/ 4 and the doctrine of"separate but equal."15

7. Id. at 409.
8. See Ozawa v. U.S., 260 U.S. 178, 192-93 (1922). In Ozawa, the debate was
whether the explicit exclusions of citizens for blacks and Indians meant that only the
enumerated races were excluded or, rather, that the Framers intended inclusion of
whites only.
9. See id.
10. U.S. Const. art. I,§ 2, cl. 3.
11. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. This policy reflects the Yick Wo principle which originated in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885) (holding that a facially neutral statute requiring permits
for laundry operators violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment when all Chinese applicants were denied permits).
13. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 275 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). See also
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879) (holding the Fourteenth
Amendment was "one of a series of constitutional provisions having a common purpose,
namely securing to a race, recently emancipated, a race that through many generations
had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy."). But see City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 559 (where Justice Marshall stated that in
fact, Congress's concern in passing these Amendments was that states would not
adequately respond to racial violence or discrimination against newly freed slaves).
14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, the Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana law
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The modern era of "affirmative action" began in 1961 when
President John F. Kennedy first coined the term in Executive
Order 10,925. 16 That Order forbade federal "government
contractors from discriminating on the basis of 'race, creed,
color, or national origin."'17 It required contractors "to take
affirmative action" to prevent discrimination to applicants and
employees. 18
In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act. 19 This
ground breaking legislation prohibited "race ... [and ethnicity]
discrimination by private employers, agencies, and educational
institutions receiving federal funds." 20 The scope of affirmative
action was again expanded when President Lyndon B. Johnson
issued Executive Order 11,246 in 1965. That Order provided
"equal opportunity in Federal employment for all qualified
persons ... [and] prohibit[ed] discrimination in employment
because of race, creed, color, or national origin.'m Congress
soon after created the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission22 as a vehicle for reviewing federal affirmative
action policies. By the 1970's, federal agencies began enforcing
regulations, calling for timetables and goals to implement this
idea of affirmative action.
Forty years have passed since President Kennedy issued
Executive Order 10,925. While the initial efforts of affirmative
action were directed primarily at federal government
that required segregation of black and white train passengers. When Plessy, seveneighths white, attempted to sit in the passenger car reserved for whites, and refused to
move to the car "used for the race to which he belonged," he was ejected from the train
and arrested.
15. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 401 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("From Plessy to Brown v. Board of Education, ours was a Nation where, by law,
an individual could be given 'special' treatment based on the color of his skin.").
16. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1961). Executive Order 10,925 was
superseded by Executive Order 11,246.
17. Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
33, 33 (1992).
18. Executive Order 10,925.
19. 42 u.s.c. § 2000 (1999).
20. 42 U.S. C. §2000d of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: "No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation 'in,' be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Emphasis added.
21. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65) as amended in 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1999). Emphasis Added.
22. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972).
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employment and private industry, affirmative action gradually
extended into other areas, including admissions programs in
higher education. As the application of affirmative action
expanded, so did the group of intended beneficiaries. 23
Today, the originally intended goals of promoting equality
and eliminating race-based discrimination are confronted by
"an increasing number of Americans ... declaring war on
policies giving 'preferential' treatment to specified racial and
ethnic groups." 24 Whether out of hostility, lack of knowledge, or
simple indifference, a recent survey concludes that forty
percent to sixty percent of all white Americans incorrectly
believe that the average black American is faring about as well
as, and perhaps even better than, the average white American
in terms of their jobs, incomes, schooling and health care. 25
Government statistics show that, while they have narrowed the
gap, African Americans continue to lag significantly behind
whites in the aforementioned areas. 26 Such misperceptions may
23. Eastland, supra n. 17, at 33 ("Those whom affirmative action was intended to
benefit came to include not only blacks, the original focus of Executive Order 10,925,
but also, in most cases, Hispanics, Asian-Pacific Americans, and Native Americans.").
24. Tanya T. Murphy, An Argument for Diversity Based Affirmative Action in
Higher Education, 95 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 515, 516 (1995).
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, created to
reinforce the Thirteenth Amendment's promise of freedom and equality to the
emancipated slave, has become the primary weapon in the effort to end
affirmative action policies in employment and education. Similarly, Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which once provided an incentive to promote
equal educational opportunities, is now used as a tool to force public and
private universities to limit the reach of their affirmative action policies.
ld. at 516-17 (footnotes omitted).
25. Washington
Post/Kaiser/Harvard
Racial
Attitudes
Survey
at
http://washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/nationlsidebars/polls/race07110l.htm (Results are from a telephone survey of a
nationally representative sample of I ,709 adults-including an oversarnple of minority groupsconducted by The Washington Post, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University
March 8-April22. The total sample included 779 whites, 323 African Americans, 315 Hispanics and
254 Asians, and the margin of sampling error for each group is plus or minus four, six, seven and
nine percentage points respectively. Sampling error is only one of many potential sources of error in
this or any other public opinion poll. Fieldwork was conducted by ICR of Media, Pa.).
26. See Richard Morin, Misperceptions Cloud Whites' View of Blacks, Wash. Post
AOl (July 11, 2001) (comparing the survey results against the 2000 U.S. Census
Bureau's Current Population Survey, which found that although 49 percent of all
whites believe that blacks and whites have similar levels of education, actually about
one in six blacks-17 percent-have completed college, compared with 28 percent of all
whites. And 88 percent of all whites are high school graduates, compared with 79
percent of all blacks 25 years old or older.). Not surprisingly, 49 percent of all whites
compared to 77 percent of all blacks favored employers and colleges making an extra
effort to find and recruit qualified minorities. Survey, supra n. 25, at question 51. It is
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account for the resistance to racially influenced policies. In
1978, the U.S. Supreme Court showed that this resistance to
affirmative action was not limited to the laity.

A The Seminal Higher Education Race-based Case: Bakke
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the U.S.
Supreme Court held the University of California at Davis's (UC
Davis) quota-based admissions program unconstitutionaV7
Allan Bakke, a white male, was rejected twice for admission to
the university's medical college. 28 UC Davis rejected Bakke
despite the fact that he received better objective scores than a
number of minority students who were admitted under a two29
track special admissions program.
Mr. Bakke's resulting
lawsuit confronted the Court with the issue of whether the
school's special admission program violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 30 The trial
court found that the admissions procedure was a racial quota
and consequently violated the federal Constitution. 31 The court,

suggested that perhaps the pervasiveness of incorrect views seems to explain, in part,
white resistance to even the least intrusive types of affirmative action.
27. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276.
28. The University of California at Davis Medical School opened in 1968 with 50
freshmen seats, and expanded enrollment to 100 seats in 1971. Id. at 272. With no
special admissions program for minority or disadvantaged students, the first class
contained three Asian-Americans, but no other minorities.
The faculty created a
program over the next two years to aid "disadvantaged" applicants. A separate
admissions committee with a majority of members from minority groups was formed
and pre-screened applicants before sending them on to the general admissions
committee. See id. at 272-75. The special committee continued to send approved
applicants to the general committee until 16 of the 100 seats had been filled (8 when
there were only 50 seats). See id. at 275. Although a substantial number of the special
committee applicants were white, only minorities were admitted through the program.
See id. at 275-76, n. 5.
29. See id. at 276-77. Allan Bakke applied late in 1973 with a composite score
too low (468 on a 500-point scale) to qualifY him for admission under the regular
program. See id. at 276. Although there were still four special admissions seats open,
he was not considered for them. Bakke complained to the chairman of the admissions
committee that the progran1 was a racial or ethnic quota system. See id. Bakke
reapplied in 1974, and although he was interviewed by and received a low score from
the chairman to whom he had previously complained, he received a score of 549 on a
scale of 600. See id. at 277. He was again rejected, although, as was the case the prior
year, his scores were significantly higher than those of some special admittees. See id.
30. Bakke also claimed violations of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause
of the California Constitution and under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. !d. at
278.
31. ld. at 279.
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however, did not order Bakke's admission because he had not
shown that he would have been admitted but for the quota. 32
Upon cross-appeal, the Supreme Court of California took the
case directly from the trial court. 33 It agreed with the trial
court that the admissions program was a racial quota system,
and consequently, applied strict scrutiny. Although it found
compelling state interests for the program, the California
Supreme Court found the program not to be the least intrusive
34
way to achieve those goals. It based its decision on the Equal
Protection clause ofthe U.S. Constitution. 35
UC Davis appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. This appeal
marked the one and only time the U.S. Supreme Court has
considered the constitutionality of affirmative action programs
in university admissions. Justice Powell, writing for a divided
Court, stated that UC Davis's admissions policy created a
distinction drawn on racial or ethnic lines and, therefore, must
be subjected to "the most rigid scrutiny"36 and "the most
exacting judicial examination."37 The Court found that, of the
four justifications the UC Davis Medical School offered for its
race-based policy, only the goal of attaining a diverse student
body was compelling. 38 After finding the diversity interest to be
compelling, the Court turned its attention to the question of
whether the medical school's race-based admissions program
was necessary to achieve the goal of attaining a diverse student
body. Justice Powell stated:

32. 438 U.S. at 279.
33. See 553 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Cal. 1976).
34. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 279; see also 553 P.2d at 1162-66.
35. Bakke, 553 P.2d at 1166.
36. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (citing Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
37. Id. However, Powell stated, "that is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional." !d. It is interesting to note that the Court split into two groups with
sharply different opinions in this case. The Stevens Group, comprised of Justice
Stevens, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, concluded that the
special admissions program violated Bakke's rights under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Thus, on a statutory basis alone, the Steven Group would have admitted
Bakke to the medical school. !d. at 417-18. The Brennan Group, comprised of Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, found the school's special admissions
program constitutional. !d. at 362. This Group applied the intermediate scrutiny
standard of review. The Brennan Group found that the medical school's purpose of
remedying the effects of past societal discrimination was "sufficiently important' to
support the use of its special admissions program 'where there is a sound basis for
concluding that minority underrepresentation is substantial and chronic." Id. at 362.
38. See id. at 306-311.
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This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an
institution of higher education. Academic freedom,
though not a specifically enumerated constitutional
right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the
First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make
its own judgments as to education includes the selection
of its student body. 39
Nevertheless, the Court held that the university's program
failed to withstand strict scrutiny because race was the sole
criterion the University used to search for a diverse student
body. 40
Justice Powell, while clearly an advocate of
institutional autonomy, indicated that race may be a "plus"
factor in admissions decisions 41 and noted two university
admissions programs, which were using race as a factor. 42 The
Court specifically cited Harvard's admissions program, in
which "race has been a factor in some admissions decisions,'>4 3
and to Princeton University's admission program, in which
"race can be helpful information in enabling the admission
officer to understand more fully what a particular candidate
has accomplished and against what odds."44 Thus, according to
Justice Powell, an admissions program that uses race as a
"plus" factor will withstand strict scrutiny. 45
Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
asserted that the "central meaning" of Bakke was that
"government may take race into account when it acts not to
demean or insult any racial group [and] to remedy
disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice, at
least when appropriate findings have been made by judicial,
legislative or administrative bodies with competence to act in
39. ld. Justice Powell found support for this proposition in Sweatt u. Painter, 339
U.S. 629, 634 (1950). See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313-14.
40. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314-15.
41. Race can be a factor in determining a particular candidate's "potential
contribution to diversity without the factor of race being decisive" when compared to
the qualities exhibited by others. A list of factors could include, in addition to race,
such qualities as "exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience,
leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming
disadvantage, [or] ability to work with the poor." Id. at 317.
42. I d. at 316-17.
43. ld. at 316 (citing Amici Curiae Br. for Colum. U., Harv. U., Stan. U., and the
U. ofPa., at 2-3).
44. Id. at 317, n. 51 (citing Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race,
Princeton Alumni Weekly 7, 9 (Sept. 26, 1977)).
45. Id. at 316-17.
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this area."46 Although Justice Brennan relied on intermediate
scrutiny, he focused on the importance of remedying the effects
of past societal discrimination. 47
Justice Blackmun argued that, wholly apart from racial and
ethnic considerations, any university's selection process
inevitably results in the denial of admission to many qualified
persons. 48 Justice Blackmun found it ironic that people were so
deeply disturbed over a program where race was an element of
consciousness, yet no one said anything about higher education
institutions routinely giving preference to those with athletic
skills, to those of a certain geography, to those children of
alumni, to the affluent, or "to those having connections with
the celebrities, the famous and the powerful."49 Whichever
preferences are selected, Justice Blackmun agreed that
admissions programs were within the special competence of
academicians, administrators, and the specialists they employ,
rather than the judiciary.
Justices Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Stewart, and Justice Rehnquist, viewed "the question of
whether race can ever be used as a factor in an admissions
decision" as an issue not before the Court. 50 They found the
majority's decision superfluous. 51

B. Affirmative Action Cases Following Bakke
In the cases following Bakke, the courts struggled for the
proper test to apply to affirmative action programs in the
employment context. These cases are confusing primarily
because of the absence of a bright line rule in Bakke,
subsequent narrow majorities, changing substantive analysis
and the flip-flopping level of scrutiny applied. 52 In Fullilove v.
46. ld. at 327.
47. Id. at 362. It is important that Justice Brennan focused on societal
discrimination rather than discrimination particular to the state actor seeking to
impose a race-based remedial measure.
48. Id. at 404.
49. Id. at 405.
50. Id. at 408 & 411.
51. See id. at 411.
52. See U.S. v. Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1337 (5th Cir. 1980) ("We frankly admit
that we are not entirely sure what to make of the various Bakke opinions. In over one
hundred and fifty pages of United States Reports, the Justices have told us mainly that
they have agreed to disagree."); See also U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987)
(plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) ("Although this Court has consistently held that some
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Klutznick, 53 the U.S.
Supreme
Court examined a
congressionally created affirmative action program that, unlike
Bakke, did not involve a quota, but instead mandated that a
certain percentage of government business be awarded to
minorities under the auspices of the Minority Business
Enterprise Program. 54 Although Chief Justice Burger did not
specifically set forth the applicable standard of review, he held
that the program at issue would pass strict scrutiny. 55 Chief
Justice Burger expressly rejected the contention that Congress
must act in a color-blind fashion. 56 "When effectuating a
limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of a
prior discrimination, such a 'sharing of the burden' by innocent
parties is not impermissible."57
In United States v. Paradise, 58 the United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a temporary one-blackfor-one-white promotion scheme for Alabama state troopers. 59
An Alabama district court had ordered the color-conscious
promotion scheme after finding that the Alabama Department
of Public Safety had engaged in blatant racial discrimination
for nearly four decades. Moreover, the district court found
Alabama had willingly resisted court-ordered desegregation for

elevated level of scrutiny is required when a racial or ethnic distinction is made for
remedial purposes, it has yet to reach consensus on the appropriate constitutional
analysis"); See also Kromnick v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 739 F.2d 894, 901 (3d Cir. 1984)
("The absence of an Opinion of the Court in either Bakke or Fullilove and the
concomitant failure of the Court to articulate an analytic framework supporting the
judgments makes the position of the lower federal courts considering the
constitutionality of affirmative action programs somewhat vulnerable"), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1107 (1985).
53. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
54. The Fullilove fact pattern was similar to that which the court would face
fifteen years later in Adarand v. Pena. See id. at 473. The Public Works Employment
Act of 1977 required that 10 percent of federal grants for local works projects be used to
buy goods or services from "minority business enterprises" (MBEs). The statute
defined an MBE as a business owned at least 50 percent (51 percent in the case of
publicly owned businesses) by people who are "Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals,
Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts." Id. at 454 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 6705(F)(2) (Suppl. II
1976)). Congress adopted the plan because although there were qualified minority
businesses available to do the projects, they accounted for an "inordinately small
percentage of government contracting. I d. at 463.
55. I d. at 492.
56. Id. at 482.
57. Id. at 484.
58. U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
59. See id. at 153.
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more than ten years. 60 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
scheme survived strict scrutiny because the plan was narrowly
tailored and served a compelling governmental interest. 61 The
Court specifically noted that remedying past and present
discrimination by a state actor is unquestionably a compelling
governmental interest. 62 Justice O'Connor, however, argued
that "rigid quotas" could not be considered narrowly tailored
because no evidence existed that such quotas were necessary to
erase the effects of the department's racial discrimination. 63
Justice O'Connor believed there were more benign alternatives
available. 64
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 65 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a school board violated the Equal
Protection Clause when it extended preferential protection
against layoffs to some teachers because of their race. 66 Just as
in Bakke, the Court was splintered. Four Justices applied
strict scrutiny and held that, even if the school board's asserted
interest to correct prior discrimination was compelling, its
protection scheme was not narrowly tailored to that purpose's
fulfillment. Justice O'Connor's oft-quoted concurrence stated
that "although its precise contours are uncertain, a state
interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been found
sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context of higher
education, to support the use of racial considerations in
furthering that interest."67
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 68 the United States
Supreme Court held that the City of Richmond's Minority
Business Utilization Plan (the Plan) was unconstitutional. 69
The City of Richmond had designed the Plan in 1983 to
increase business among Minority Business Enterprises
(MBE). 70 Richmond, with an African-American population of
60. See Paradise u. Prescott. 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (M.D. Ala. 1983).
61. See id. at 166-67.
62. See id.
63. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 187 (even 37 years apparently could not justifY a
temporary "quota.").
64. See id. at 198-99.
65. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
66. !d. at 284.
67. !d. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Powell's Bakke opinion).
68. 488 u.s. 469 (1989).
69. See id. at 511.
70. See id. at 4 78.
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fifty percent, had awarded less than one percent of its contracts
to minorities between 1978 and 1983 and had virtually no
minority members in its contractors' associations. 71 The Court
found that the Plan was not narrowly tailored to remedy the
effects of past discrimination, 72 and that the city had failed to
demonstrate a compelling governmental interest. 73The Court
also stated that Richmond had failed to attempt race-neutral
alternatives before enacting the Plan. 74
Justice O'Connor, writing the opinion for the Court in City
of Richmond, stated that the Plan failed the narrow-tailoring
test because it was unrealistic to assume that minorities would
choose the construction trade in proportion to their numbers in
the population. The relevant numbers of African-Americans
were, according to Justice O'Connor, not the fifty percent of
African-American population of the City of Richmond, but
rather the pool of qualified Minority Business Enterprise
contractors. 75 Justice O'Connor concluded that, "in sum, none of
the evidence presented by the city points to any identified
discrimination in the Richmond construction industry."76
Justice O'Connor stated that the City was wrong in relying on
general findings of discrimination in the entire construction
industry.
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
disagreed with Justice O'Connor's position that racial
classifications were only permissible to remedy past wrongs. 77
However, he did agree that the Plan benefited persons who
were not victims of discrimination, and that the Plan imposed a
stigma on its beneficiaries. 78
Justice Scalia, who concurred only in the judgment, would
have held that state and local governments may never
discriminate on the basis of race to remedy the effects of past
discrimination. 79 Justice Scalia concluded:
Racial preferences appear to "even the score" (in some
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See id. at 479-80.
See id. at 507-08.
See id. at 505.
See id. at 507.
Id. at 501-02.
Id. at 505.
See id. at 511.
See id. at 515-16.
See id. at 520.
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small degree) only if one embraces the proposition that
our society is appropriately viewed as divided into races,
making it right that an injustice rendered in the past to
a black man should be compensated for by
discriminating against a white. Nothing is worth that
embrace. 80
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 81 a five-Justice majority
held that "benign" race-based classifications enacted by
Congress are to be subjected to intermediate scrutiny. 82 The
Court stated that racial classifications would withstand
intermediate scrutiny if they did not "impose undue burdens on
nonminorities."83 Two FCC policies were at issue in Metro
Broadcasting. 84
These policies favored minority-owned
businesses, applying for radio and television broadcast
licenses. 85 In upholding the policies, Justice Brennan, who
wrote the majority, took pains to detail the lack of minority
ownership of radio and television stations. 86 He underscored
the point that the FCC had only adopted race-conscious
methods after other methods had been tried and failed. 87 He
announced:
We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated
by Congress-even if those measures are not "remedial"
in the sense of being designed to compensate victims of
past governmental or societal discrimination-are
constitutionally permissible to the extent that they
serve important governmental objectives within the
power of Congress and are substantially related to
achievement ofthose objectives. 88
Justice Brennan held that Congress's interest in enhancing
broadcast diversity was "at the very least, an important
80. ld. at 528.
81. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
82. See id. at 596-97. Note: This was Justice Brennan's last opinion before
retiring. He was replaced with David Souter who assisted in overruling Metro
Broadcasting in Adarand v. Pena.
83. !d.
84. See id. at 552.
85. Minorities were defined by the FCC as "Black, Hispanic, Surnamed, American
Eskimo, Aleut, American Indian and Asiatic American extraction." ld. at 553 n. 1.
86. Although in 1986 minorities made up at least 20% of the population, they
owned only two. One percent of the 11,000 radio and television stations in the U.S. See
id. at 553.
87. See id. at 554-56.
88. !d. at 564-65 (footnotes omitted).
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governmental objective" in the context of radio and television
programmmg. 89
0

1. The Application of Bakke's Strict Scrutiny for Race-based
Classifications
InAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 90 the Court overruled
its decision in Metro Broadcasting91 to apply intermediate
scrutiny and held that race-based classifications are
constitutional only if they are "narrowly tailored measures that
further compelling governmental interests."92 In other words,
the Court's holding in Adarand resolved all existing
ambiguities by making strict scrutiny the standard of review
for race-based programs. Hence, strict scrutiny applies to racebased programs regardless of whether the programs are state
or federal, or whether they benefit the racial majority or the
racial minority. 93
In Adarand, Adarand Constructors, Inc. sued the federal
government when congressionally created preferences resulted
in the award of a guardrail subcontract to the minority-owned
Gonzales Construction Company. 94 Gonzales was awarded the
project despite the fact that Adarand had submitted the lowest
bid for the project. 95
Adarand sought declaratory and
89. Id. at 566-67.
90. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
91. See id. at 225.
92. See id. at 227.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 205.
95. See id. The prime contractor, Mountain Gravel & Construction Company,
received additional compensation if it hired subcontractors certified as small
businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." Id.
Gonzales was certified; Adarand was not. Mountain Gravel would not have chosen
Gonzales but for the additional compensation. See id. Under the relevant statutory
provision, social and economic disadvantage could be manifest in a person of any race,
but the contractor was allowed to presume such disadvantage in the case of AfricanAmerican, Hispanic American, Native American, Asian Pacific Americans and other
minorities. See id. (citing section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 637 (d)(2)(3)
(1994). The Act defines "socially disadvantaged individuals" as those individuals who
are subject to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias, and defines "economically
disadvantaged individuals" as those individuals who are socially disadvantaged
individuals with a diminished ability to compete in the free enterprise system. See id.
at 206 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 637 (a)(5), (a)(6)(A)). The compensation was one of a number
of provisions designed to provide such individuals with not less than 5 percent of
subcontracts. See id. at 206. However, non-minorities could prove disadvantaged
status on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence," and the presumption of
disadvantage enjoyed by minorities could be rebutted by third persons. See id. at 207-
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injunctive relief against use of race-based presumptions. 96 It
argued that the government's use of race-based presumptions
in their project award process violated the Equal Protection
component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 97
The district court granted the government's motion for
summary judgment, 98 and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 99 The Tenth Circuit read
Fullilove as having adopted "a lenient standard, resembling
intermediate scrutiny in assessing" federal race-based
measures, and held that Metro Broadcasting had refined this
lenient standard. 100
Because the case was brought under the Fifth Amendment,
the Court then re-examined the differing levels of scrutiny it
had applied under the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments.
The Court ultimately found that the level of scrutiny it had
applied under the two, different Amendments was essentially
the same. 101 Thus, strict scrutiny should apply to race-based
actions whether taken by a state government or the federal
government.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, looked at
whether race-based governmental actions should be subjected
to strict scrutiny when benefiting historically disadvantaged
groups. While she concluded that federal and state programs
to
benefit
"disadvantaged
businesses"
were
not
unconstitutional, she intimated that it may be difficult for
those programs to pass strict scrutiny. 102 Past and present
discrimination against the minority group in question must be
proven, rather than assumed, and the proponent must show
that its program benefits only the victims of past
discrimination. 103
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the
appellate court's judgment in Adarand and remanded the case
to the district court. 104 It instructed the district court to

08.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See id. at 210.
Id. at 204.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1992).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (lOth Cir. 1994).
515 U.S. at 210 (citing 16 F.3d at 1544-47).
See id. at 217.
I d. at 228 (quoting Stevens, J., dissenting at 246).
See id. at 228-29.
See id. at 239.
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determine whether the government's use of subcontractor
compensation clauses could survive strict scrutiny. 105
Justice Scalia concurred in the majority's judgment but
declined to join in Part III-C of Justice O'Connor's opinion. He
believed that racial preferences can never survive strict
scrutiny. 106 A "government can never have a 'compelling
interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make
up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction."107
Justice Ginsburg did not agree with Justice Scalia. 108 For
Justice Ginsburg, the irony of Justice Scalia's claim that "we
are just one race" was apparent in the fact that the present
effects of past discrimination exist today because our
lawmakers and judges have not been color-blind for
generations. 109 Justice Thomas, like Justice Scalia, also
concurred in the judgment, but wrote separately to emphasize
his belief that there is not a "racial paternalism exception to
the principle of equal protection." 110 Thus, Justice Thomas
would not favor distinctions based upon race.
Adarand went back to the district court, as per the U.S.
Supreme Court's command, to evaluate the federal contracting
procurement of the Subcontractor Compensation Clause, which
continued to use race-conscious presumptions. The district
court granted Adarand's motion for summary judgment,
finding the government's program unconstitutional. 111 The
government, meanwhile, changed the way in which it
implemented the race-conscious program in highway
construction matters. 112 Quotas were not permitted, and to
ensure that contractors benefiting from the program were truly
disadvantaged, the recipients needed to demonstrate that their
net worth was less than $750,000. On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's holdings
and held that the Subcontractor Compensation Clause
Program and the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise

105. See id. at 238.
106. See id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring). For Justice Scalia, strict scrutiny would
indeed be fatal in fact.
107. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
108. See id. at 271 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
109. See id. at 272 (quoting 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
110. !d. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgement).
111. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Colo. 1997).
112. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 228 F.3d 1147, 1155 (3d Cir. 2000).

211]

BACK TO BAKKE

227

Certification Program were permissible and constitutional. 113

2. The Fourth Circuit and Race-based Admissions Policies
In Podberesky v. Kirwan, 114 the Fourth Circuit was faced
with the issue of whether the University of Maryland at
College Park's Banneker scholarship program for MricanAmericans could survive strict scrutiny. 115
Unlike the
aforementioned cases, the plaintiff in this case was Hispanic,
not white. The university argued, and the district court
agreed, that the scholarship program was aimed at the present
effects of past discrimination. The district court found that the
program was narrowly tailored to remedy those present
effects. 116 The university was able to demonstrate that there
was a basis for the perception by African-Americans that a
hostile climate existed at the university. 117 The University of
Maryland
relied
on
statistical
data,
namely
the
underrepresentation of African-Americans in the student
population and their low retention and graduation rates, to
demonstrate the present effects. ns The university argued that
the purpose of the Banneker scholarship was to increase the
number of qualified African-American Maryland residents
attending the University. 119 Further, the university posited
that Banneker scholars would act as role models, thereby
attracting more African-American students to the school. 120
The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed the district court's
summary judgment in favor of the university. 121 The court of
appeals took issue with the district court's finding that the
university suffered present effects of past racial discrimination.
The court of appeals attributed the current problems at the

113. Id.
114. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995).
115. See id. at 151. The Banneker scholarship program was a merit-based
program open only to African-Americans.
116. See id. (citing 838 F. Supp. at 1075, 1094 CD. Md. 1993)).
117. See id. at 154.
118. See id. at 155.
119. See id. at 159.
120. See id. It is not clear why awarding a scholarship to an African-American
from any state besides Maryland is any less capable of remedying the effects of past
University discrimination than awarding the same scholarship to a Maryland-born
African-American but the court seemed focused on this.
121. See id. at 161.
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university to societal discrimination. 122
The fact societal
discrimination existed precluded the inference of a nexus
between past university discrimination and the hostility felt by
current students. 123
The court of appeals was similarly
unimpressed by the university's statistical information,
revealing low Mrican-American populations, and found that
the possibility of other causes, such as "economic ... factors,"
existed. 124
Even if the university had been able to demonstrate
sufficient present effects of past discrimination, the court of
appeals suggested that the program still would have failed the
"narrowly tailored" prong of the strict scrutiny test. 125 The
university's averred purpose was to increase the number of
qualified African-American Maryland residents attending the
university. However, the court of appeals found the fact that
the scholarships were not exclusively for Maryland residents to
be "indicative of lack of narrow tailoring."126 Finally, the court
of appeals found the fact that the University had not attempted
any race-neutral alternative measures to be determinative. 127

3. The Fifth Circuit and Raced-based Admissions Policies
Cheryl Hopwood, Douglas Carvell, Kenneth Elliott, and
David Roger were white, Texas residents, who applied for
admission to the University of Texas Law School in 1992. 128 All
four were rejected, and they brought suit against the law
school, claiming violations of their rights under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 129 The crux of
their complaint was that the law school's affirmative action
admissions program subjected them to unconstitutional racial

122. See id. at 155. Although the district court found that student surveys and
focus groups revealed hostility through class segregation, social situations and dining
rooms, treatment by fraternities and sororities, and patronizing behavior by faculty.
Id. at 154, n. 2.
123. Societal discrimination was found by the fact that several Northern
universities suffered from similar racial problems. See id. at 154.
124. See id. at 155-56.
125. See id. at 160-61.
126. See id. at 159.
127. Id. at 161.
128. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert denied 518 U.S. 1033
(1996) ("Hopwood IF').
129. Id. at 938. The plaintiffs also claimed statutory violations under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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discrimination.
The admission procedure employed by the law school in
1992 was based on the availability of 500 seats. Initially, each
application was assigned to one of the three administrative
categories, which were based solely on the applicant's Texas
Index (TI) score: 1) presumptive admit, 2) discretionary zone,
and 3) presumptive deny. 130 The TI scores required for
placement in the various categories were lower for minority
applicants than for non-minority applicants. 131 In 1992, the
cutoff scores were adjusted several times to increase the
number of presumptive admits.
By March 1992, the
"presumptive admit" threshold for non-minority applicants was
at a TI score of 199, and the denial ceiling for those applicants
was at 192. For minority applicants, the presumptive admit
threshold was 192, and the presumptive denial ceiling was
179. 132 Once an application had been placed in one of the three
administrative categories, different procedures were used for
determining whether admission would be offered. 133
The district court analyzed the law school's admissions
program under a strict scrutiny standard of review. 134 Of the
five reasons the law school offered for maintaining its
admissions program, the district court held that two of the
reasons qualified as compelling government interests:
!)"obtaining the [educational] benefits that flow from a racially
and ethnically diverse student body" and 2) "overcoming the
past effects of discrimination."135 In considering the scope of
past discrimination, the district court rejected the applicants'
argument that past discrimination be limited to the law
school's history. Instead, the district court held that Texas
"institutions of higher education are inextricably linked to the

130. ld.
131. Id. The term "minority" as used in the Law School's admissions procedure
refers only to African Americans and Mexican Americans. Id. at 265, n. 29.
132. I d. (citing Hopwood B, 999 F. Supp. at 880) (citation omitted).
133. ld.
134. Hopwood u. Texas (Hopwood 1), 861 F. Supp. 551, 569 (W.D. Tex. 1994), reu'd,
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), reh'g en bane denied, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996) cert.
denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
135. Id. at 570. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that under
recent Supreme Court decisions, the only compelling government interest for racebased programs was remedying the past effects of racial discrimination. "However,
none of the recent opinions is factually based in the education context and, therefore,
none focuses on the unique role of education in our society." I d.
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primary and secondary schools in the system,"136 and as a
result, Texas' history of racial discrimination in public schools
contributed to the law school's reputation among minorities as
137
both a "white school" and a hostile environment.
The district court upheld that part of the admissions
program that gave minorities a "plus" by treating their IT
scores differently based upon race. 138 However, the district
court struck down the part of the admissions program that
used separate admissions committees, which never compared
candidates of different races. 139
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit also applied the strict scrutiny
standard of review. The court of appeals, in contrast to the
district court, found that neither attaining a diverse student
body nor remedying the effects of past discrimination were
sufficiently compelling governmental interests to justify the
law school's race-based admissions program. 140 Writing for the
court of appeals, Judge Smith supported his holding on three
different bases. First, Judge Smith wrote that Justice Powell's
diversity rationale in Bakke "[was] not binding precedent on
this issue." 141 Second, "no case since Bakke has accepted
diversity as a compelling state interest under a strict scrutiny
analysis." 142 Previous U.S. Supreme Court decisions indicate
that the only compelling state interest to justify racial

136. Id. at 571. The court noted that even if past discrimination were limited to
the University of Texas alone, there would still be a strong basis for concluding that
remedial action was warranted. Id. at 572.
137. Id. There was no evidence of'overt officially sanctioned discrimination" at the
University of Texas. The school had expended considerable effort in recruiting
minorities and minimizing racial discrimination. However, the court found that the
school's "legacy of the past' still persisted into the present. Id. The University of Texas
continued to implement discriminatory policies against both black and Mexican
American students during the 1950s and 1960s. Id. at 555. Between 1978 and 1980,
the Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Office for Civil Rights (OCR) investigated
Texas' public higher education system and found that it was not in compliance with
Title VI and still maintained vestiges of de jure segregation. I d. at 556. "To date, OCR
has not completed its evaluation to determine if Texas is in compliance with Title VI."
Id. at 557.
138. Id. at 578.
139. Id. at 578-79.
140. Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 962.
141. Id. at 944. Judge Smith wrote that the word "diversity" was mentioned only
once in Justice Powell's single-Justice opinion, and that when he "announced the
judgment, no other Justice joined in that part of the opinion discussing the diversity
rationale." Id.
142. Id.
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classifications is remedying the effects of past discrimination.
Third, Judge Smith opposed the use of race as a means of
achieving student body diversity on policy grounds. 143 He wrote
that the use of race in higher education admissions "contradicts
rather than furthers, the aims of equal protection." 144 It
"simply achieves a student body that looks different. Such a
criterion is no more rational on its own terms than would be
choices based upon the physical size or blood type of
applicants." 145 Judge Smith stressed that a school could
reasonably consider many other factors outside of race in
making its admissions decisions, including those "which may
have some correlation with race."146
A university may properly favor one applicant over
another because of his ability to play the cello, make a
An
downfield tackle, or understand chaos theory.
admissions process may also consider an applicant's
home state or relationship to school alumni. Law
schools specifically may look at things such as unusual
or substantial extracurricular activities in college,
which may be atypical factors affecting undergraduate
grades. Schools may even consider factors such as
whether an applicant's parents attended college or the
applicant's economic and social background. 147
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals next turned its attention
to an evaluation of the purported compelling, government
interest of remedying the effects of past discrimination. Noting
that a state actor "must ensure .. .it has convincing evidence
that remedial action is warranted,"148 the court of appeals
concluded that the law school, not the entire State of Texas'
educational system, was the appropriate governmental unit for
measuring a constitutional remedy. 149 Each of the three present
effects of past discrimination: hostile environment for
minorities, school's poor reputation among minorities, and
143. !d.
144. Id. at 945.
145. ld. Judge Smith wrote further: "Diversity fosters, rather than minimizes, the
use of race. It treats minorities as a group, rather than as individuals. It may further
remedial purposes but, just as likely, may promote improper racial stereotypes, thus
fueling racial hostility." ld.
146. Id. at 946.
147. Id.
148. ld. at 950.
149. Id.
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underrepresentation of minorities was rejected by the court. 150
The Fifth Circuit held that the law school had not shown a
compelling state interest in remedial discrimination sufficient
to justify its use of a race-based admissions program. 151
Judge Wiener of the Fifth Circuit wrote a concurring
opinion in Hopwood. 152 Although he agreed with the result, he
disagreed that "diversity can never be a compelling
governmental interest in a public graduate school." 153 Judge
Wiener would have held the admissions program
unconstitutional on grounds that it was not narrowly tailored;
the program limited the label "minorities" to only African
Americans and Mexican Americans. 154 Judge Wiener was also
very uncomfortable with the majority's outright rejection of
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. He wrote: "If Bakke is to be
declared dead, the Supreme Court, not a three-panel circuit
court, should make that announcement." 155 Subsequently, a
suggestion for rehearing en bane was denied when a majority of
the Fifth Circuit's sixteen regular active judges declined to
rehear the issue. 156 Seven judges dissented from the rehearing
denial with sharp criticism, writing that the "far-reaching
importance" of the decision "demanded the attention of more
than a divided panel."157
A petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court
was also denied. 158 Although Justices Ginsburg and Souter
acknowledged that the constitutional issue of race or ethnicity150. The court relied on Podberesky u. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 153 (4th Cir. 1994),
that the poor reputation was due to "historical fact" which was not the kind of present
effect that could justifY current racial classifications. Hopwood II, 78 F.3d 952-53. In
addition, the court wrote that "one cannot conclude that the law school's past
discrimination has created any current hostile environment for minorities." Id. at 953.
Rather, any racial tensions were the result of present societal discrimination. Finally,
the court rejected the underrepresentation of minorities as a present effect of past
discrimination.
Id.
There was no showing of "overt officially sanctioned
discrimination." !d. at 954 (quoting Hopwood I, 861 F. Supp. at 572).
151. Id. at 955. Because there was no showing of a compelling state interest, the
Fifth Circuit did not have to consider whether the admissions program was narrowly
tailored to achieve the state interest.
152. !d. at 962 (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 963.
156. Hopwood u. Texas (Hopwood II[), 84 F.3d 720, 720, cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033
(1996).
157. Id. at 722.
158. 518 u.s. 1033.
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based admissions programs in higher education "is an issue of
great importance," the law school's objectionable admissions
program had already been discontinued for some time, making
the issue moot. 159
On remand for other issues, the district court found, 160 and
the Fifth Circuit affirmed, none of the plaintiffs in Hopwood
would have been offered admission in 1992 even under a raceblind system. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's
injunction, thereby refusing to permit consideration of race in
the law school's admission process.
The United States
161
Supreme Court refused to review the Fifth Circuit's holding.
There is little doubt that the Hopwood decision has reignited the debate over preferential admissions policies.
Because the U.S. Supreme Court chose not to review the case,
one cannot state with certainty that Judge Smith's underlying
reasoning is correct. However, two factors do seem to weaken
his analysis. First, the negative sentiment generated by his
decision likely limits Hopwood's legal impact. In fact, at least
one Texas law school dean has openly defied Hopwood's
conclusions. 162 Second, Hopwood, since it was decided by the
Fifth Circuit, is only binding precedent on the courts of Texas,
Louisiana, and Mississippi. Louisiana and Mississippi have
continued to use racial preferences after Hopwood because of
federal court orders to desegregate their higher education
systems. 163
4. The Ninth Circuit and Race-based Admissions Policies
In Smith v. University of Washington Law School/ 64
Katuria Smith, Angela Rock, and Michael Pyle brought suit on

159. ld.
160. Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (Hopwood B).
161. Hopwood v. Texas, 533 U.S. 929 (2001).
162. See Barbara Bader Aldave, Hopwood v. Texas: Much Ado About Nothing?
Tex. L. 43 (Nov. 11, 1996) (writing as dean of St. Mary's University School of Law in
San Antonio: "I can promise you this: Unless and until my superiors order me to stop,
we at St. Mary's University School of Law are going to ignore the Hopwood decision
and adhere to the guidelines of Bakke. I am immensely proud that 41 percent of the
students in our first year class are members of minority groups, and that our school
now has a higher percentage of Mexican-American students than any other law school
in the United States.").
163. See Cathy Young, The High Price of Racial Preferences, Boston Globe A15
(June 27, 2001).
164. 2 F. Supp.2d 1324 (W.D. Wash. 1998).
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behalf of themselves and a class of Caucasians, claiming they
had been denied admission to the University of Washington
Law School because of racially discriminatory admissions
policies. 165 From 1994 to December of 1998, the law school used
race as a criterion in its admissions process to assure the
enrollment of a diverse student body. 166
The school's
admissions policy stated:
Important academic objectives are furthered by classes
comprised of students having talents and skills derived
from diverse backgrounds believed to be relevant to a
rich and effective study of law. Factors that indicate
this diversity include, but are not limited to, racial or
ethnic ongm, cultural background, activities or
accomplishments, career goals, living experiences ... , or
special talents. The list is not exhaustive, and the
factors are not of equal weight; moreover, no single
factor is dispositive. 167
Moreover, the policy stated "affirmative action will be taken to
increase substantially the number of minority group
members ... in educational programs where they have been
traditionally underrepresented." 168
Applicants to the law school were admitted based on their
undergraduate grades, LSAT scores, and a "personal
statement," in which they were invited to describe how their
life experiences would contribute to the diversity of the law
school. 169 A three-step process of review was conducted to
apportion approximately one hundred sixty-five seats. 170 Both
minority and non-minority applications were reviewed in
concert and ranked on a scale from three to fifteen. Offers
were made based on an applicant's index score. 171 The plaintiffapplicants offered statistics they contended raised questions

165. Id. at 1328. Katuria Smith applied for and was denied admission in 1994, Ms.
Rock in 1995, and Mr. Pyle in 1996.
166. Id. The Law school's admission policy provided that its objective was to
"select individuals who have the highest potential for achievement and
contribution .... The Law school has determined this objective is best obtained by ...
individuals who have demonstrated the greatest capacity for high quality work ... and
who will contribute to the diversity of the student body." Id.
167. Id. at 1329.
168. Id. at 1330.
169. Id. at 1329.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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about the role of race in the University of Washington's
admissions policies. The plaintiffs noted that in 1994, for
example, nearly seventy-nine percent of those admitted with
172
index scores below 193 were racial minorities.
In 1994, one
hundred percent of African-American applicants with GPAs
between 2.5 and 3.24, and with LSAT scores in the 155-159
range, were admitted while none of the 131 candidates
identified as "white or other ethnicity" with comparative grades
and LSAT scores were admitted. 173
While Smith was pending, the voters of the State of
Washington passed Initiative Measure 200, which enacted the
following provision: "[T]he state shall not discriminate against,
or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on
the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting."174 Upon the passage of Measure 200, the law
school eliminated the use of race as a criterion in its admission
process. The new admissions policy, however, did retain a
diversity clause, which stated that "important academic
objectives are furthered by. . . students. . . from diverse
backgrounds." 175 Nevertheless, race, color, and national origin
were excluded from the list of diversity factors. 176 In the final
analysis, the district court granted the law school's motion to
dismiss, declaring the individual and class claims moot due to
the passage of Initiative Measure 200. 177 However, the district
court did hold that race could be used as a factor in achieving
educational diversity even where it is not done for remedial
purposes. 178
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed, inter alia, two key
issues: 1) whether educational diversity is a compelling
governmental interest under strict scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and 2) whether race may be
172. Id. at 1330.
173. Id.
174. Wash. Rev. Code§ 49.601.400(1).
175. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1192. The non-exhaustive list of factors indicative of
diversity include: persevering or personal adversity or other social hardships; having
lived in a foreign country or spoken a language other than English at home; career
goals; employment history; educational background; evidence of and potential for
leadership; geographic diversity or unique life experiences; and special talents. I d.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1196.

236

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2003

considered in the admissions process only for remedial
purposes. 179 The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court
and held: 1) that educational diversity is a compelling
governmental interest that meets the demands for strict
scrutiny, and 2) that the Fourteenth Amendment permits
university admissions programs to consider race for reasons
other than remedial purposes. The court examined the
fractured ruling of Bakke to determine whether Justice
Powell's concurring opinion was truly the controlling opinion.
The court decided that it was.
We are well aware of the fact that much has happened
since Bakke was handed down. Since that time, the
court has not looked upon race-based factors with much
favor. Still, it has not returned to the area of university
admissions, and has not indicated that Justice Powell's
approach has lost its vitality in that unique niche in our
. t 180
SOCle y.
On May 29, 2001, the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 181 Although the state of Washington's Initiative
Measure 200 prohibited the consideration of race in public
education, Smith became binding precedent for the states of
Nevada, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Oregon. California,
which is also located within the Ninth Circuit, passed
Proposition 209, a referendum, prohibiting the consideration of
. pu bl'1c e d uca t'10n. 182
race 1n

5. The Eleventh Circuit and Race-based Admissions Policies
Two seminal cases, involving race-conscious admissions
programs, took place within the Eleventh Circuit. Wooden v.
Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia concerned
the University of Georgia's (UGA) admissions policy from 1995
to 1997. Its admissions program during this period was based
on a three-stage process. 183 In the initial stage, the Academic
Index or AI stage, UGA objectively judged applications without
regard to the applicant's race. In 1997, to be admitted to the

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
2001).

Id. at 1192.
Id. at 1200 (cites omitted).
Smith v. U. of Wash. L. Sch., cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 2192 (2001).
Cal. Const. art. I § 31 (1996).
Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the U. Sys. of Ga., 24 7 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir.
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university during the AI stage, an applicant to UGA was
required to have an AI score of 2.50 or above. Applicants with
an AI below 2.25 were rejected outright. 184 Those students
whose academic indices were above a certain number and met
the minimum SAT scores were put into a "further evaluation"
185
group.
In other words, their applications continued on in the
process. Green, the only surviving plaintiff, was among that
group of applicants, with an AI of 2.39 and an SAT equivalency
score of 1170-1190. 186
Much of the district and appellate court opinions in Wooden
were devoted to standing. The courts focused on whether
187
Green suffered an "injury in fact."
UGA alleged that, because
Green's race was not a factor in the ultimate decision to deny
his application, he lacked standing to challenge UGA's
admission policy. Even if Green had received the 0.5 point
credit for his "non-white" ethnic status, UGA proffered that his
application still would have been tossed out in the final, ER
stage. In other words, although UGA may have affirmatively
considered his race at some point in the admissions process,
the unrebutted evidence showed that its final decision to reject
his application was not based on race.
In opposition, Green argued that he had standing because
UGA's admissions process inflicted a constitutional injury upon
him. Just having his application threaded through a process
that considered race was enough, he argued.
Citing
Jacksonville, 188 Green contended "a plaintiff who challenges an
ongoing race-conscious program and seeks forward-looking
184. ld. at 1266.
185. ld.
186. Id. For each applicant placed in this group, the university calculated a Total
Student Index (TSI). The TSI is based on a combination of weighted academic and
demographic factors. It is only at this stage that the university expressly considered
an applicant's race, although other factors such as Georgia residence, alumni
relationships, extracurricular activities and after-school hours were considered as well.
In calculating a TSI score for applicants to the 1997 freshman class, UGA awarded 0.5
points under the category "Demographic Factors" to applicants who self-classified
themselves as non-Caucasians. Applicants, such as Green, who did not do this, did not
receive the point credit. Green received a TSI score of 3.89, which included credits for
his parents' educational level, his Georgia residency, his relatively high GPNSAT score
and his male gender. Had he designed himself as white, his TSI score of 4.39 would
have been 0.5 points higher than it was, but still lower than the 4.40 threshold for
automatic admission. I d.
187. Id. at 1270.
188. N.E. Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508
U.S. 656, 666 (1993).
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relief need not affirmatively establish that he would receive the
benefit in question if race were not considered. The relevant
injury in such cases is 'the inability to compete on an equal
· m189
fioo t mg.
The appellate court ruled that, for standing purposes, the
issue was whether Green's application had actually been
treated differently at some stage in the admissions process
because of his race. 190 If his application was treated differently,
then Green had not competed on an equal footing with other
applicants, and consequently he suffered an injury-in-fact.
Conversely, if Green's application was never actually treated
191
differently because of his race, then Green had no standing.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's summary
judgment of no standing and remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings.
In a different case, Johnson v. University of Georgia, 192 the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia held
that the promotion of student body diversity in higher
education was not a compelling interest sufficient to meet the
test of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 193 This case concerned the 1999
admissions process for the University of Georgia.
The University of Georgia subjected its 1999 applicants to a
three-stage evaluation process except that, in contrast to the
1997 process, that required an AI score of 2.50 or above for
automatically admittance in the first stage, 1999 applicants
needed a minimum AI score of 2.86 to be automatically
admitted. 194 TSI scores were again used to re-rank applicants
who were not automatically admitted or rejected in the second
stage. Persons of color still received the 0.5 point credit toward
their TSI score, and males received an additional 0.25 TSI
points simply because of their gender. Hence, a non-white
male could receive an additional 0. 75 TSI points. 195 To be
automatically admitted in 1999 during the TSI stage,
applicants needed a TSI score over 4.92; in contrast, applicants
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1269.
See id. at 1278.
Id.
Johnson v. U. of Ga., 106 F. Supp.2d 1362 (S.D. Ga. 2000).
ld. at 1375.
ld. at 1365.
ld.

BACK TO BAKKE

211]

239

needed a TSI score of 4.40 in 1997. Those 1999 applicants
having a TSI score between a 4.66-4.92 were referred to the
ER or final stage. 196
Plaintiff Jennifer Johnson, a white female, received a TSI
score of 4.10. Since she did not receive the additional 0.75 TSI
points, which were allocated for non-white males, her TSI was
below the 4.66 second-stage cutoff. Consequently, she was
denied admission without the ER-phase review. 197 Had she
received the additional 0. 75 TSI points, she would have
qualified for the ER stage.
Ms. Johnson was, however,
eventually admitted to UGA three days after bringing this
action, but by that time, she had already been accepted to and
planned on attending another University. 198
The two remaining plaintiffs in Johnson, Aimee Bogrow
and Molly Ann Beckenhauer received second-stage TSI scores
of 4.52 and 4.06, respectively. 199 Just as with Ms. Johnson,
neither Ms. Bogrow nor Ms. Beckenhaur was awarded the 0.75
race/gender point credits. Had UGA awarded those points, Ms.
Bogrow would have been admitted, and Ms. Beckenhauer
would have qualified for ER consideration. 200 However, without
the bonus points, both persons were denied admission.
The district court determined strict scrutiny to be the
applicable standard of review. The court then addressed the
issue of whether using racial preferences to promote "diversity"
was a compelling governmental interest that would survive
strict scrutiny. 201 The University of Georgia claimed the TSI
phase of its admission plan was patterned on the Harvard Plan
that Justice Powell spoke of, and approved of, in Bakke. The
district court, however, found Justice Powell's view of
Harvard's admissions system to be "mere dicta."202 In addition,
since Justice Powell's "statements ... gained the support of no
other J ustice,"203 his opinion should not be considered by courts
. d'mg prece d en t .204
as b m

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

I d.
I d.
ld. at 1366.
I d.
I d.
I d.
Id. at 1369.
I d.
I d.
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UGA's difficulty stemmed from its inability "to
meaningfully show how [racial diversity] actually foster[ed]
educational benefits."205 Former UGA President Charles Knapp
argued that educational diversity was a compelling interest
because, after graduation, students will need to work
cooperatively with people from "different ethnic and cultural
backgrounds," and this skill "cannot be fully acquired by
students whose educational and life experiences have been
racially or culturally homogenous."206 Judge Edenfield of the
district court found such generalized assertions to be merely
speculative.
In addition, the district court noted that
affirmative action programs were usually approved only for
limited durations, and UGA was ill-prepared "to identify with
particularity exactly when or how that goal. .. [would] be
met."207 Likening the case to Croson, the district court held that
UGA's system used race as a proxy for a purported interest:
that minorities, through their presence, make a valued
contribution to the other students' education. 208 This interest
was insufficient to meet strict scrutiny according to the district
court.
6. The Sixth Circuit and Race-based Admissions Policies
In Gratz v. Board of Regents of the University of Michigan,
plaintiffs Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher, both white,
Michigan residents, applied for admission into the University
of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA)
in 1995 and 1997, respectively. 210 Both persons were denied
admission and subsequently filed a motion for summary
judgment, asserting that LSA's use of race as a factor in
admissions decisions violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and the Equal Protection Clause of
211
the United States Constitution.
Two compelling interests were asserted by LSA and its
209

205.
1999)).
206.
207.
208.
209.
2000).
210.
211.

ld at 1371 (citing Tracy v. Bd. of Regents, 59 F. Supp.2d 1314, 1322 (S.D.Ga.

!d. at 1372.
!d. at 1372.
!d. at 1374.
Gratz v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of Mich., 122 F. Supp.2d 811 (E. D. Mich.
Id. at 815.
ld. at 813.
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minority intervenors. First, LSA had a compelling interest in
the educational benefits that result from having a diverse
student body. Second, LSA had a compelling interest in
remedying the University of Michigan's past and current
discriminatory practices against minorities. 212
Recognizing that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke came
from a sharply divided court, the district court in Gratz labeled
the desire by the University of Michigan for a diverse student
body a compelling interest. 213 "It is clear that a majority of the
Justices in Bakke expressly agreed that the California Supreme
Court erred in enjoining the university from ever considering
race in its admission programs."214 Dismissing the Fifth's Circuit
Hopwood decision, Judge Patrick Duggan of the Sixth Circuit
opined that the Fifth Circuit erred in reading Justice
Brennan's silence in Bakke as rejection. 215 In fact, his silence
could have just as easily been interpreted as "implicit
approval." 216 Upon examination of past U.S. Supreme Court
cases, involving the diversity rationale and strict scrutiny, the
Gratz court found that those cases did not apply because they
did not involve the context of higher education. 217
Interestingly, the University of Michigan presented
overwhelming expert testimony and solid evidence, regarding
the educational benefits that flowed from a racially and
ethnically diverse student body. 218 One study, presented by
Professor Patricia Y. Gurin, 219 cited research suggesting that
"[s]tudents learn better in a diverse educational environment,
and they are better prepared to become active participants in
[a] pluralistic, democratic society once they leave such a

212. ld. at 816.
213. !d. at 819.
214. !d.
215. ld. at 820.
216. !d.
217. Id. at 821.
218. !d. at 822-23.
219. Professor of Psychology at the University of Michigan and Interim Dean of the
LSA. Professor Gurin used her thirty-four years of experience in social psychological
research and teaching to analyze data from a Michigan Student Study and nine years'
worth of data from a national sample of institutions and students from the Cooperative
Institutional Research Program in her report. See Patricia Gurin, The Compelling
Need
for
Diversity
in
Higher
Education,
at
http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/epertlsumm.html (accessed July 20,
2001).
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setting."220
In addition, Professor Gurin cited to multiinstitutional national data, extensive surveys, and data drawn
from specific classroom programs at the University of Michigan
to show that "students who experienced the most racial and
ethnic diversity in classroom settings and in informal
interactions with peers showed the greatest engagement in
active thinking processes, growth in intellectual engagement
and motivation, and growth in intellectual and academic
skills."221 These students, she averred, were also "better able to
understand and consider multiple perspectives, deal with
conflicts that different perspectives sometimes create, and
appreciate the common values and integrative forces that
harness differences in pursuit of common ground."222 A number
of amici-filed briefs in Gratz concurred with the University of
Michigan and Professor Gurin's position; diversity results in a
richer educational experience for students. 223
To this evidence, the plaintiff-applicants presented no
argument or evidence to rebut the University and Professor
Gurin's assertions. Rather, the plaintiffs' main argument was
that diversity was an important goal, but did not rise to the
level of a compelling, state interest. The district court found
the goal of achieving a diverse student body a compelling
interest. 224
The district court then examined whether LSA's admission
program was narrowly tailored. The court held it was. 225 LSA's
admission counselors took race into account in two
determinative and important ways: each underrepresented
minority applicant could be assigned twenty points on account
of race at the outset in calculating his or her index score, and/or
admissions counselors could "flag" an applicant as possessing
certain qualities or characteristics, including physical qualities,

220. Gratz, 122 F. Supp.2d at 822 (citing Gurin Report, supra n. 219, at 3).
221. Id. (citing Gurin Report, supra n. 219, at 5).
222. Id.
223. Along with the ALS and ACE, the following filed amicus briefs in support of
the University's position: the United States, the State of Ohio, the Michigan Attorney
General, General Motors corporation, Steelcase, Inc., joined by nineteen other global
corporations, and the National Association of Social Workers, joined by the Council on
Social Work Education, the Association of Baccalaureate Social Work Program
Directors, Inc., and the Group for the Advancement of Doctoral Education in Social
Work. Id. at n. 13.
224. Id. at 824.
225. !d. at 828.
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which LSA deemed important to the composition of the
incoming class. 226 The court held such uses of race operated as
nothing more than "plus" factors, which Justice Powell
enunciated, and approved of, in Bakke. 227
Moreover, minority applicants were not insulated from
review by virtue of these additional twenty points any more
than other applicants were insulated from review by virtue of
other points given. In fact, the Court noted that in certain
circumstances, these other, possible points might combine for a
total of up to forty. 228 The fact that these points might "tip the
balance" in favor of a particular applicant, however, did not
mean that such applicants had been insulated from
compe t 1"t"Ion. 229
Further, the district court held the University of Michigan's
program was not a "dual' or "two-tracked" system prohibited by
Bakke. 230 The program at issue in Bakke had one group of
students, i.e., minority students, competing for one set of seats,
and another group of students, i.e., majority students,
competing for another set of seats. This process, in effect,
created two, separate admissions programs. Nothing in Bakke,
however, prohibited the practice of employing different GPA
231
requirements for minorities vis-a-vis majority students.
Further, LSA's system did not utilize a separate admissions
review committee for underrepresented minority applications
as did the review committee in Bakke. 232
Finally, the district court in Gratz found LSA's efforts to
enlarge its pool of underrepresented minority applicants
through vigorous minority recruitment programs, which had
all proved to be unsuccessful, determinative. 233 Recruiting
fairs, direct mailings, campus visits, and personal contact with
minorities continually resulted in a low pool of minority
applicants.
226. !d. at 827.
227. !d. at 828.
228. !d. Points were given as follows: Six points for geographic factors, four points
for alumni relationships, three points for outstanding essay, five points for leadership
and service skills, twenty points for socioeconomic status or twenty points for athletes.
!d.
229. !d.
230. Id. at 828.
231. !d.
232. !d.
233. !d. at 831.
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In another Sixth Circuit case, Grutter v. Bollinger, 234
Barbara Grutter applied for admission to the University of
Michigan Law School in 1996. 235 At first, she was placed on the
waiting list, but in June of 1997, she was denied admission.
Ms. Grutter brought suit, alleging that she was rejected
because the law school used race as the "predominant" factor in
its admission process, giving minority applicants a
"significantly greater chance of admission than students with
similar credentials from disfavored groups." 236 She claimed
racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 237
Since 1992, the University of Michigan Law School's
admissions policy had openly acknowledged a commitment to
racial and ethnic diversity. 238 Both in its written admissions
policy and its law school bulletin, the law school stressed its
effort to increase the numbers of students from racial and
ethnic groups. "By enrolling a 'critical mass' of minority
students, we have ensured their ability to make unique
contributions to the character of the Law School."239
Under Michigan's system, law school applicants were
selected from one of three groups. The first group consisted of
applicants who were chosen based on the "numbers."240 The
second group consisted of a pool of applicants who had lower
"numbers" but other interesting qualities. The third group,
known as the "special admission" group, was for minority
candidates who did not fall within the other two groups.

234. Grutter u. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp.2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
235. !d. at 824.
236. !d. (quoting Plaintiffs Complaint).
237. !d. She also claimed defendants violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Ms. Grutter sought declaratory judgment that her rights were
violated; an injunction prohibiting racial discrimination in admissions; compensatory
and punitive damages; an order requiring the defendants to admit her to the law
school; and attorney fees and costs. !d. at 824.
238. Id. at 827. The admissions policy explains that applicants with lower index
scores may be admitted because they "may help achieve that diversity which has the
potential to enrich everyone's education and thus make a law school class stronger
than the sum of its parts." Id. (quoting the UMLS Admissions Policy at 3). This is
referred to as "diversity admissions". Additional factors to be considered include: an
applicant's interesting or unusual employment experiences, extracurricular activities,
travel experiences, athletic accomplishments, volunteer work, or foreign language
fluency.
239. !d. at 828 (quoting the Admissions Policy at 12).
240. !d. at 830.
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Approximately one-half of the minority applicants, who were
ultimately admitted, came from the first two groups; the other
half came from the third or special group. 241 The "special
admissions" program was adopted to increase the minority
242
population at the law school.
At trial, Michigan's law school
Director of Admissions from 1979 to 1990 testified that "the
law school had a 'goal' or 'target' whereby ten to twelve percent
of the students of each entering class should be Black, Chicano,
243
Native American, and mainland Puerto Rican."
Admission
was handled on a "rolling basis," and "daily reports" were used
to keep track of the number of applications received to date, the
number of applicants offered admission, the number rejected,
244
the number on the waiting list, and so on. As the admissions
season progressed, the Director of Admissions admitted he
consulted the "daily reports" more often in order to ensure that
a "critical mass" of minority students was enrolled. 245
At trial, no one seemed to be able to quantify what was
meant by "critical mass," but one administrator testified that,
during his tenure from 1979-1990, at least eleven to seventeen
percent of each class consisted of African American, Hispanic,
and Native American students. 246 One admissions director
defined
it
as
"meaningful
numbers,"
"meaningful
representation," or "a number sufficient so that the minority
students can contribute to classroom dialog and not feel
isolated."247 However, university witnesses were adamant that
the university did not have a set number, percentage, or
"quota" for this "critical mass" achievement.
While the law school posited that race was only one element
in the admissions decision-making process, the trial court
seemed persuaded by statisticians who testified that
Michigan's law school placed a very heavy emphasis on an

241. ld.
242. !d.
243. ld. at 831. In fact, testimony revealed that over the years, the law school
faculty agreed that black and Hispanic students should constitute between 10 percent
and 12.5 percent of the entering class.
244. !d. at 832.
245. !d.
246. ld.
24 7. !d. at 832-33. Defining "critical mass" was important to the court in
determining whether a targeted number had been preset. Testimony revealed that the
consideration of race was crucial. Had admissions decisions been driven by the
numbers, only ten minority students per entering class would have been admitted ..
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applicant's race in deciding whether to accept or reject the
applicant.
"When cell by cell, and year by year,
underrepresented minority applicants are admitted in
significantly greater proportions than their non-minority
competitors with similar UGPA and LSAT scores, it is clear
that the law school accords the race of the applicants a great
deal ofweight."248
The trial court then addressed the issues of whether the
achievement of racial diversity was a compelling state interest
and, if so, whether the law school's admissions policy was
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 249 In reviewing Bakke,
the court noted that Justice Powell was the only Justice to
mention diversity. "The Brennan group did not so much as
mention diversity rationale in their opinion, and they
specifically declined to join in the portion of Justice Powell's
opinion that addressed that issue." 250 The law school argued
that Justice Powell's opinion was controlling because it was the
narrowest ground that supported the judgment. 251 The trial
court held that Bakke did not stand for the proposition that a
state educational institution's desire to assemble a racially
diverse student body is a compelling governmental interest. 252
Further, the court held that under post-Bakke U.S. Supreme
Court cases, the achievement of such diversity was not a
compelling state interest because it was not a remedy for past
discrimination. 253
The court did not hold that racial diversity was
unimportant, but it did draw a distinction between viewpoint
diversity and racial diversity. 254 Although the experts that
testified in Grutter had also testified during the Gratz case, the
court, nevertheless, refused to find a compelling interest in
diversity.
Even if the university had convinced the court that
diversity was a compelling interest, the admissions program
was deemed to have failed the "narrow tailoring" test for
several reasons. First, no witness could define what "critical
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 842.
I d. at 843.
ld. at 846.
Id. at 847.
ld at 848.
ld. at 849.
I d.
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mass" meant in terms of percentages or numbers. 255 "Narrow
tailoring is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve when the
contours of the interest being served are so ill-defined."256
Second, there was no time limit on the law school's use of race
in the admissions process, and, by using race to ensure the
enrollment of a certain minimum percentage; the law school
had practically set up a quota system. "There is no principled
difference between a fixed number of seats and an essentially
fixed minimum percentage figure." 257 Third, under Michigan's
system, students did not compete against one another for each
seat. There was no logical basis for the law school to have
chosen the particular racial groups that received special
attention under the current admissions policy. 258 Fourth, the
law school failed to utilize alternative means for increasing
.
"ty enro ll men t .259
m1non
The Grutter trial court ordered an injunction, enjoining the
law school from considering race as a factor in its admission
260
process.
On May 14, 2002, in a 5-4 decision the Sixth Circuit
reversed the District Court's judgment in Grutter, 261 holding
that the law school's interest in achieving a diverse student
body was a compelling interest, surviving strict scrutiny
pursuant to Bakke. 262 The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the
district court's refusal to apply the Marks analysis to Bakke
"because Justice Powell's rationale was not 'subsumed' in that
of the Brennan concurrence."263 In fact, the Sixth Circuit found
Justice Powell's opinion to be the narrowest, a decision in line
with the Marks analysis. "[T]he Brennan concurrence agreed
with Justice Powell that Davis's admissions program was
255. Id. at 850.
256. ld.
257. ld.
258. Id. The 1992 admissions policy, at page 12 identifies "African Americans,
Hispanics and Native Americans". Later, the law school bulletin indicated that special
attention has been given to "students who are African American, Mexican American,
Native American, or mainland Puerto Rican." Id.
259. Id. at 853. The court lists race-neutral alternatives such as: increasing
recruiting efforts, using a lottery system for all qualified applicants, decreasing the
emphasis for all applicants on undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores, or a system
whereby a certain number or percentage of the top graduates from various colleges and
universities are admitted. Id.
260. I d. at 872.
261. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F. 3d 732 (6th Cir 2002).
262. See id. at 739.
263. Id. at 740.
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subject to heightened scrutiny.... [It] disagreed only with his
application of strict scrutiny ....As Justice Powell's rationale
would permit the most limited consideration of race ... it is at
the most Bakke's narrowest rationale."264
The Sixth Circuit also disagreed with the district court's
contention that Justice Powell was the only Justice to mention
diversity. The Sixth Circuit opined that Justice Brennan's first
footnote gave qualified approval of a race-conscious admissions
policy: "We also agree with Mr. Justice POWELL that a plan
like the 'Harvard' plan ... is constitutional under our approach,
at least so long as the use of race to achieve an integrated
student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of past
discrimination." 265 Further, the language "at least so long as"
does not mean "only if."266 The court of appeals argued that this
qualifying language only "modifies when race may be used ... it
does not modify why. 267 Thus, a university need not show that
it is remedying specific instances of past discrimination in
order to use race as a factor in admissions. The Sixth Circuit
quoted Justice Brennan's opinion in Metro Broadcasting, lnc., 268
citing Bakke "for the proposition that a 'diverse student body'
contributing to a 'robust exchange of ideas' is a 'constitutionally
permissible goal' on which race-conscious university
admissions programs may be predicated."269
The Sixth Circuit spent considerable time favorably
comparing Michigan's law school admissions policy to the
Harvard plan approved of in Bakke. Just as in the Harvard
plan, Michigan used race and ethnicity, along with a number of
other factors, as a potential "plus."270 Moreover, like the
Harvard plan, no student was insulated from competing with
other prospective students at Michigan. 271 "That the Law
264. Id. at 741.
265. ld. at 742 (emphasis in original) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326 n.l (citations
omitted) (emphasis added)).
266. ld.
267. ld. at 742-43.
268. 497 U.S. 547, 568 (1990), overruled on other grounds Adarand, 525 U.S. at
227.
269. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 743.
270. ld. at 746-47. "In seeking an academically diverse class, the record indicates
that the Law School considers more than an applicant's race and ethnicity." Id. "In
light of the foregoing, we find that the Law School's consideration of race and ethnicity
is virtually indistinguishable from the Harvard plan Justice Powell approved in Bakke.
Id. at 747.
271. See id.

211]

BACK TO BAKKE

249

School's pursuit of a 'critical mass' has resulted in an
approximate range of underrepresented minority enrollment
does not transform 'critical mass' into a quota."272
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the remaining factors the
district court had used to declare that the law school's
admissions program as not narrowly tailored. 273 "First, the
district court's conclusion that the term 'critical mass' is not
sufficiently defined is at odds with the extensive record in this
case, and the district court's own characterization of 'critical
mass' as the functional equivalent of a quota." 274 Second, as to
"the district court's statement that 'there is no logical basis for
the law school to have chosen the particular groups which
receive special attention under the admissions policy,"275 the
Sixth Circuit stated that "some degree of deference must be
accorded to the educational judgment of the Law School in its
determination of which groups to target."276 As to the district
court's assertion that the law school had not availed itself of
alternate means to increase minority enrollment, the Sixth
Circuit contended that the evidence suggested otherwise. "We
note that we do not read Bakke and the Supreme Court's
subsequent decisions to require the Law School to choose
between meaningful racial and ethnic diversity and academic
selectivity. "277
Finally, the Sixth Circuit examined the district court's
determination that the law school's policy must fail because
there was no definite stopping point. The court of appeals
agreed that a race-conscious remedial program should have a
self-contained stopping point. 278
However, as the court
succinctly pointed out, "this directive does not neatly transfer
to an institution of higher education's non-remedial
consideration of race and ethnicity."279 The United States
Supreme Court has granted Barbara Grutter's petition for writ
272. Id. at 748.
273. ld. at 749. "As a initial matter, we have serious reservations regarding the
district court's consideration of five factors not found in Bakke." ld.
274. ld. at 751.
275. ld. (quoting Grutter, 137 F.Supp.2d at 850).
276. ld. (quoting Regents of the U. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985)).
277. Id. at 750.
278. ld. at 751.
279. !d. at 752. The dissent and concurring opinions, while critical of the majority
opinion, are unique in that they seem to be written in an effort to complain about the
procedures used to hear this case en bane. See id. at 752-773.
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of certiorari. 280

III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF REMOVING RACE-BASED ADMISSIONS
POLICIES

A. California and Proposition 209
On November 5, 1996, fifty-four percent of Californians
voted to adopt Proposition 209, otherwise known as the
"California Civil Rights Initiative."281 Proposition 209 prohibits
discrimination and racial and gender preferences in public
employment, public education, and public contracting. 282 One
day after Proposition 209 was passed, the constitutionality of
the Initiative was challenged in Coalition for Economic Equity
u. Wilson. 283 The plaintiffs in Wilson asserted that Proposition
209 interfered with their equal protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore, sought a preliminary
injunction, enjoining state officials from implementing the
Initiative. 284
The district court began by noting that much of the
language contained in Proposition 209 "simply affirm[ed]
existing anti-discrimination protections already provided by
the United States and California Constitutions and by the 1964
Civil Rights Act." 285 However, the district court did find that
Proposition 209 had a racial focus and restructured the
political process "to the detriment of the interests of minorities
and women." 286 Consequently, the district court granted the
287
preliminary injunction.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held
that Proposition 209 did not violate the United States
Constitution and vacated the injunction. 288
280. Grutter v. Bollinger, 2002 U.S. Lexis 8677 (Dec. 2, 2002).
281. Cal. Const. art. I § 31.
282. Cal. Const. art. I § 31, cl. A ("The state shall not discriminate against, or
grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or
public contracting.").
283. 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (Wilson I).
284. ld. at 1488, 1491.
285. ld.
286. ld. at 1506.
287. ld. at 1520.
288. Wilson II, 122 F. 3d 692, 710 (9th Cir. 1997).
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What are the effects of Proposition 209? In 1996, 89
Hispanics, 43 African Americans, and 10 Native Americans
were enrolled as first year students at the top three public
California law schools. 289 In 1997, the year Proposition 209
took effect, these numbers fell to 59, 16, and 4, respectively. 290
Enrollment of minorities in California's law school had declined
by eighty-one percent. At University of California, Berkeley,
only one African American enrolled in the freshman law class
in 1997, whereas twenty had been enrolled in the freshman
class the year before. 291 Between 1994 and 1996, thirteen
Filipinos were enrolled at Boalt. 292 After Proposition 209,
Boalt's 1997 class included zero Filipinos, as did its 1999
entering class. 293 After a similar initiative passed in the State
of Washington in 1998, the number of applications,
acceptances, and enrollments of minority students at the
University of Washington dropped by comparable measures for
the 1999 freshman class. 294
Even using college-transfer
policies, in part, as a way around the ban on racial preferences
in admissions, the numbers still dropped. 295
B. Texas and the Aftermath of Hopwood

The Hopwood decision, which banned the consideration of
applicants' race in university admissions in the Fifth Circuit,
also affected enrollment of underrepresented minority
students. At the University of Texas School of Law at Austin,
whose admissions system was challenged in Hopwood, the
percentage of the entering class that was African American
dropped from five-point-eight (twenty-nine students) in 1996 to
point-nine percent (four students) in 1997. 296The percentage of
Native Americans enrolled at that law school dropped from
one-point-two percent (six students) in 1996 to point-two

289. Grutter, 137 F. Supp.2d at 858.
290. ld.
291. Id. See also Larry Reibstein, What Color is an A?, Newsweek 77 (Dec. 29,
1997).
292. See Boalt Hall School of Law, 1999 Annual Admission Report 11 (1999).
293. See id.
294. See Roberto Sancho, UW Minority Enrollment to Fall-Officials Plan to
Improve Recruitment, Outreach, Seattle Times A12 (May 18, 1999).
295. See, Sara Hebel, States Without Affirmative Action Focus on CommunityCollege Transfers, Chron. of Higher Educ. A35 (May 26, 2000).
296. Grutter, 137 F. Supp.2d at 858.
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percent (1 student) in 1997. 297 Enrollment for Hispanics
dropped from nine-point-two percent (forty-six students) in
1996 to six-point-seven percent (thirty-one students) in 1997. 298
In an attempt to alleviate the effects of the Hopwood
decision, the Texas legislature adopted a policy, guaranteeing
all students who finish in the top ten percent of their high
school class admission to any state university. 299 This type of
program has also been initiated in Florida under the Florida
One Initiative, whereby the top twenty percent are guaranteed
admission to the state universities. 300
On March 19, 1999, the University of California Board of
Regents adopted a similar policy of admission, guaranteeing
admission to all California applicants who ranked in the top
four percent of their high school class. The plan was devised by
Governor Davis as a means of booting minority numbers in the
UC system. 301
The Texas and California programs have been criticized for
two main reasons. First, critics argue such an approach has
the effect of "admitting some students from weaker high
schools while turning down better-prepared applicants who
happen not to finish in the top tenth of their class in
academically stronger schools."302 "College admissions officers
have long known that class rank is hardly comparable from one
high school to the next. The top students in many high poverty
schools are woefully unprepared for college."303 Second, since
the very success of producing a diverse student body depends
on the continuing de facto segregation of high schools, the

297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See Robert M. Berdahl, Essay, Policies of Opportunity: Fairness and
Affirmative Action in the Twenty-First Century, 51 Case W. Res. 115, 123 (2000).
300. ld. Governor Jeb Bush celebrated an almost 12 percent increase in the
proportion of minorities attending public universities for fall 2000, the first year of
Florida's controversial plan to end affirmative action in college admissions. However,
the actual proportion of minorities in the freshman class of 2000-2001 remained
relatively unchanged from 1999-2000. Opponents argued that the enrollment surge
had more to do with population growth than with his policy to end racial preferences.
See Gary Finout, Florida Governor Touts Minority Enrollment Increase after Racial
Preferences Ban, Black Issues in Higher Educ. 17 (Sept. 28, 2000).
301. Kenneth R. Weiss, UC Regents OK Plan to Admit Top 4%, L.A. Times A18
Mar. 20, 1999).
302. Gratz, 122 F.Supp.2d at 830 (quoting William Bowen).
303. Gary Orfield & Edward Miller, Chilling Admissions 10 (Harv. Civ. Rts.
Project & Harv. Educ. Publishing Group 1998).
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cause of a fully integrated and racially just society is not
advanced. 304

1. Expert Opinions on Race-based Admissions Policies
Expert after expert testified in Gratz and Grutter, setting
forth reasons why affirmative action programs continue to be
needed in higher education, why they are important as a
remedy for past and present discrimination, and the compelling
need for diversity in higher education. 305 Disproportionate
numbers of Native Americans, Mrican Americans, and
Hispanics live and go to school in impoverished areas of the
country. "It should not surprise anyone that students, who
attend school where books are lacking, where classrooms are
overcrowded, and where advanced placement or other higher
level courses are not offered, are at a competitive disadvantage
as compared to students, whose schools do not suffer from such
shortcomings."306
Advanced placement courses are not
available in every high school. "As many as twenty-five
percent of California's high schools offer no AP courses
whatsoever. Yet some high schools, four percent, offered
twenty-one or more AP courses."307 Imagine graduating from
high school with a 4.0 grade point average only to be rejected
for admission in favor of a student, whose straight "A" grade
point was boosted to 5.0 due to AP courses. Indeed, our
nation's public schools as a whole are currently under attack
for their inability to offer a quality education to our nation's
youth. 308 The top students in general are not performing as

304. A 1993-1994 study comparing student scores on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills
showed that black students in mostly segregated schools failed to reach the national
average for their age bracket, while black students in integrated schools exceeded the
national average.
See Gary Orfield, Susan Eaton & Harv. Project on Sch.
Desegregation, Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of
Education 130-31 (The New Press 1996). Moreover, scores for both black and white
students rose by approximately 20 points during a period of time when busing
promoted racial diversity in the area schools. I d. at 132.
305. See Gratz, 122 F.Supp.2d at 822-24; see also Grutter, 137 F.Supp.2d at 849-50.
306. Grutter, 137 F. Supp.2d at 864.
307. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Essay: Two Views of the River: A Critique of the
Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 928, 944 (2001); see also,
William G. Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term Consequences of
Considering Race in College and University Admissions 18-19 (Princeton U. Press
1998).
308. See Paul E. Peterson, School Choice: A Report Card, 6 Va. J. Soc. Policy & L.
47, 54-58 (1998), for a survey of the public school system that concludes that big city
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well on standardized tests as they once did. If affirmative
action in higher education is to be dismantled, the quality of
primary and secondary education must first be stable.
An extensive body of research indicates that Blacks and
Latinos have consistently scored more poorly on standardized
SAT and LSAT tests than white and Asian Americans. 309 Many
studies have challenged the usefulness of standardized tests in
predicting the performance of poor and minority students,
finding that the SAT does a better job of predicting the socioeconomic status of the test taker's parents than predicting
college performance. 310 One explanation for this is that to some
extent, standardized tests, like the SAT and the LSAT, are
"heavily loaded with academic English."311 This disadvantages
Hispanics because English is their second language. Mrican
Americans are also disadvantaged because many-sixty
percent- speak "Black English."312
It is undisputed that underrepresented minority groups
have, on average, lower undergraduate grade-point averages
(UGPA) than whites. "Among applicants accepted by the
University of Michigan Law School from 1995 to 2000, the
median UGPA of every underrepresented minority group has
been lower than the median UGPA of Caucasians by
approximately one-tenth to three-tenths of a point. 313 One
cannot ignore the large amounts of research that point
conclusively to the benefits of racial diversity to all students.
The Shape of the River, 314 a book written by William Bowen and
Derek Bok, former presidents at Princeton and Harvard,

schools are the worst off, but that the "problems in American education are endemic."
ld. at 47; see also Nat!. Commn. on Excellence in Educ., A Nation At Risk 5 (Dept. of
Educ. 1983). The study warned that "the educational foundations of our society are
presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a
Nation and a people ... we have, in effect, been committing an act of unthinking,
unilateral education disarmament."
309. See Nicholas Lemann, The Great Sorting, A. Mthly. 84, 99-100 (Sept. 1995)
(arguing that use of the SAT achieves mixed results, sometimes at the expense of
students at the bottom of the social structure who are least prepared for the test).
310. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action:
Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 953, 957 (1996) (criticizing the
continued reliance on standardized tests).
311. Grutter, 137 F. Supp.2d at 862 (quoting Dr. Eugene Garcia, Dean of the
School of Education, U.C. Berkeley).
312. Id.
313. Grutter, 137 F. Supp.2d at 864.
314. Bowen, supra n. 307.
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respectively, draws on a forty-year longitudinal study of more
than 80,000 black and white students who attended twentyeight of the nation's best colleges and universities. The book
begins with the authors' bias: they believe that the end of
affirmative action would impoverish us all. 315 Full of statistics,
graphs, tables, and multivariate regressions, The Shape of the
River constitutes a compelling brief for race-sensitive
admissions in higher education. In addition, Patricia Gurin,
Professor of Psychology at the University of Michigan, has
shown that experience with diversity in college has impressive
effects on the extent to which graduates in the national survey
lived racially and ethnically integrated lives. 316 Professor
Gurin's studies represent the first time a major university has
amassed empirical data to show that segregated education is
substandard education. 317 "Students who experienced the most
racial and ethnic diversity in classroom settings and informal
interactions with peers showed the greatest engagement in
active thinking process, growth in intellectual engagement and
motivation, and growth in intellectual and academic skills."318
As Justice Powell in Bakke made very clear, it is a
university's prerogative to decide what to teach and who to
admit, so long as individual freedoms are not trampled upon. 319
If race is used as one simple though important factor, to ensure
the diversity and equality of access to quality or elite
educational facilities, that should be a compelling interest to
meet strict scrutiny. The law doesn't treat everyone equally. If
a student is denied admission in favor of a student with lower
SAT scores, but has an alumni mother, does it make it any
more fair? Some applicants will get points for being athletes,
for their age, and/or for their family background. Others will
get points for playing chess, for being from Iowa, and/or for
having alumni relationships. Some applicants will even get
points for their financial contributions or celebrity status.
Therefore, it follows that some applicants should get points for
adding to the cultural enrichment of all.

315. Id.
316. See Gurin, supra, n. 219.
317. Id. Gurin's study, relied on heavily in Gratz, utilized data collected from
nearly 200 colleges and universities in reaching its conclusion to uphold the University
of Michigan's race-conscious admission program.
318. Id.
319. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
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IV. SUMMARY

Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, 320 the U.S.
Supreme Court has frequently recognized the uniqueness of the
educational setting in Equal Protection cases. Specifically, the
Court has acknowledged "those qualities which are incapable of
objective measurement" and the importance of providing an
educational environment conducive to "the interplay of ideas
and the exchange of views."321 Justice Powell specifically
recognized the importance of diversity in higher education, as
have judges across the nation.
The primary mission of colleges and universities is to
educate those students who are likely to become the leaders of
society in an increasingly diverse world.
The learning
environment of higher education is special; it encourages the
robust exchange of ideas and of culture. More importantly, the
extent to which a college student is exposed to diversity has
impressive effects on the extent to which he or she later lives a
racially and ethnically integrated life. A racially diverse
campus is essential to the education of students.

320. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy u. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) by
concluding "that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has
no place"). The Court wrote "Education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments .... It is the very foundation of good citizenship." I d. at 493.
321. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634.

